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Local routing protocols in scale free networks have been extensively studied. In this paper 
we consider a wireless contextualization of this routing problem and analyze on the one 
hand how cooperation affects network efficiency, and on the other hand the stability of 
cooperation structures. Cooperation is interpreted as local exchange of topological 
information between cooperating agents, and the payoff of a certain node is defined based 
on its energy consumption during the routing process. We show that if the payoff of the 
nodes is the energy saving compared to the all-singleton case, basically coalitions are not 
stable. We introduce coalitional load balancing and net reward to enhance coalitional 
stability and thus the more efficient operation of the network. As in the proposed model 
cooperation strongly affects routing dynamics of the network, externalities will arise and the 
game is defined in a partition function form. 
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Kooperatív routingjátékok skálafüggetlen vezeték 
nélküli hálózatokon 
Csercsik Dávid 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
Skálafüggetlen hálózatok lokális routingprotokolljait széles körben tanulmányozták. Ebben 
a cikkben ennek a routingproblémának egy vezeték nélküli esetét tekintjük át, és egyfelől azt 
tanulmányozzuk,  hogy a kooperáció hogyan befolyásolja a hálózat hatékonyságát, másfelől 
pedig a kooperáló struktúrák stabilitását vizsgáljuk. A kooperációt a lokális topológiai 
információ kölcsönös megosztásaként értelmezzük, és egy adott csomópont kifizetését 
energiafelhasználása alapján definiáljuk. Megmutatjuk, hogy ha a csomópontok kifizetése a 
csupa singleton esethez képest energiamegtakarítás, akkor a koalíciók alapvetően nem 
stabilak. Bevezetjük a koalicionális terheléskiegyenlítést és a hálózati jutalmat a koalíciók 
stabilizálásának érdekében, mely biztosítja a hálózat hatékonyabb működését. 
Mivel a javasolt modellben a kooperáció erősen befolyásolja a hálózati dinamikát, 
externáliák jelennek meg, így a játékot partíciós függvény formában definiáljuk. 
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Abstract
Local routing protocols in scale free networks have been extensively studied. In
this paper we consider a wireless contextualization of this routing problem and analyze
on the one hand how cooperation affects network efficiency, and on the other hand the
stability of cooperation structures. Cooperation is interpreted as local exchange of
topological information between cooperating agents, and the payoff of a certain node
is defined based on its energy consumption during the routing process. We show that
if the payoff of the nodes is the energy saving compared to the all-singleton case,
basically coalitions are not stable. We introduce coalitional load balancing and net
reward to enhance coalitional stability and thus the more efficient operation of the
network. As in the proposed model cooperation strongly affects routing dynamics of
the network, externalities will arise and the game is defined in a partition function
form.
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1 Introduction
Scale-free (SF) networks (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Barabási, Albert, and Jeong, 1999)
are often used as a tool to describe the topology of communication networks (Albert, Jeong,
and Barabási, 1999). In most cases it is a valid assumption that a certain node is not aware
of the topology of the whole system. This may be especially true in wireless networks
(Abolhasan, Wysocki, and Dutkiewicz, 2004; Hong, Xu, and Gerla, 2002; Garg, Aswal,
and Dobhal, 2012; Mauve, Widmer, and Hartenstein, 2001) where the network topology
itself is often subject to change because of fading due to changing environmental eﬀects and
potential mobility of the nodes. In such cases the delivery of packages may be performed by
local routing protocols (Wang, Wang, Yin, Xie, and Zhou, 2006). Such routing problems
in so called complex networks have been widely studied (for surveys see e.g Wang and
Zhou (2006); Chen, Huang, Cattani, and Altieri (2011)). Although results corresponding
to cooperative approaches in wireless networks can be found in the literature (see e.g.
Khandani, Modiano, Abounadi, and Zheng (2005); Khandani, J.Abounadi, E.Modiano,
and L.Zheng (2007); Ibrahim, Han, and Liu (2008)), these models usually do not consider
SF network type ﬁxed communication structure and are not focusing on local routing
methods.
In the past years, game theoretic approaches in telecommunications (Douligeris and
Mazumdar, 1992; Altman and Wynter, 2004; Altman, Boulognea, El-Azouzi, Jimenez, and
L.Wynter, 2006) and wireless environment (Han, Niyato, Saad, Basar, and Hjorungnes,
2012; Al-Kanj, Saad, and Dawy, 2011) became more and more popular, including coali-
tional approaches as well (Saad, Han, Basar, Debbah, and Hjorungnes, 2009; Saad, Han,
Debbah, Hjorungnes, and Basar, 2009a; Saad, Han, Debbah, and Hjorungnes, 2008; Saad,
2010; Saad, Han, Debbah, Hjorungnes, and Basar, 2009b; Pantisano, Bennis, Saad, Deb-
bah, and Latva-aho, 2012).
Considering the more traditional game theory literature, networks (Jackson, 2008) and
routing have been among the popular topics of the ﬁeld recently, however usually selﬁsh
(Feldmann, Gairing, Lucking, Monien, and Rode, 2003; Roughgarden, 2005; Kontogiannis
and Spirakis, 2005; Johari, Mannor, and Tsitsiklis, 2006) or competitive (Orda, Rom, and
Shimkin, 1993; Cominetti, Correa, and Stier-Moses, 2006) routing models are considered,
while coalitional approaches and models including externalities (Csercsik and Sziklai, 2012;
Csercsik and Imre, 2013) are less representative.
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In this article we propose a model to describe cooperation and analyze coalitional
stability in wireless local routing SF network models. Basic traﬃc models considering local
routing as (Wang, Wang, Yin, Xie, and Zhou, 2006) assume that the neighboring nodes are
only aware of each others degree. Cooperation in the interpretation of the proposed model
will mean that cooperating players exchange their local topological information (practically
the list of their neighbors), which information will serve as a basis for packet routing. For
the aim of simplicity, we assume that only neighboring nodes may cooperate, which implies
that coalitions have to form complete graphs in the network.
In other words, while singleton models use ﬁrst order routing while forwarding the
packets (they look for the packet’s destination only among their own neighbors), nodes
in a coalition may search the neighbor list of some of their neighbors (their coalitional
partners), and forward the packet according to this if match with the packet destination
is found.
Since such exchange and utilization of second degree local information will aﬀect the
routing dynamics (e.g. in general it is straightforward to assume that packets will spend
less time in the network if the routing eﬃciency is increased this way), cooperation will
aﬀect the energy consumption of nodes not taking part in the coalition. Since node payoﬀs
will be deﬁned based on individual energy consumption, this implies that externalities will
appear, thus the game will be described in partition function form (Thrall and Lucas,
1963).
Partition function form games represent a novel approach for telecommunication prob-
lems, and they have been recently successfully applied for OFDMA (Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiple Access) problems in femtocell networks (Pantisano, Bennis, Saad, Ver-
done, and Latva-aho, 2011; Pantisano, Bennis, Saad, and Debbah, 2011; Pantisano, Bennis,
Saad, Debbah, and Latva-aho, 2012).
2 Materials and methods
First of all, we assume that the nodes of the graph correspond to players or in other words
agents, who may determine their strategy, namely they may choose to cooperate with other
nodes or act selﬁshly. As mentioned, we will interpret our model in a wireless context where
the transmission cost a single packet is proportional (in this case for the aim of simplicity
equal) to the square of the distance. This will mean that we assign geometric positions to
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the nodes of the graph, namely a coordinate pair in the unit square. Furthermore, during
the generation of the communication graph we take spatial information into account as
well.
For the generation of the network we use the geometry-modulated version of the
Barabási-Albert algorithm (Barabási and Albert, 1999), as described in (Manna and Sen,
2002). A seed with nseed nodes and mseed link is used, and an iterative process is applied
during which in each time step a new node with random position in the unit square is
introduced and is randomly connected to m previous nodes. Any of these m links of the
new node introduced at time t connects a previous node i with an attachment probability
pi(t) which is linearly proportional to the degree ki(t) of the i-th node at time t and to
lβ, where l denotes the Euclidean distance of the new node and node i, and β is a free
parameter. β < 0 corresponds to the case when nodes are more likely to connect closer
ones. We call the resulting graph the communication graph.
pii(t) ∼ ki(t)l
β (1)
The basic traﬃc model based on (Wang, Wang, Yin, Xie, and Zhou, 2006) is described
as follows: at each time step, there are R packets generated in the system with randomly
chosen sources and destinations. We assume that each packet in the network holds infor-
mation about its destination node. The buﬀer (queue) size of the nodes is assumed to be
inﬁnite, but any node can forward at most C (ﬁnite) packets in each time step. To make
the model independent of the update order of the nodes, we assume that one packet can
hop only once during a certain time step. To navigate packets, singleton nodes nodes per-
form a local search. If the packet’s destination is found among the neighbors, it is delivered
directly to its target. Otherwise, it is forwarded to a chosen neighbor via the local routing
mechanism.
In the current work we assume that the energy cost of cooperation (exchanging local
topological information) can be neglected compared to the energy cost of packet forwarding.
Nodes in a coalition perform ﬁrst a local search, and if it is unsuccessful, they perform a
second degree search among the neighbors of their coalitional partners as well. If a member
of the actual coalition is found, which is adjacent to the packets destination, the packet will
be forwarded to that node (since coalitions form complete graphs, this is always possible).
In a coalition with three or more players it is possible that the packet destination is adjacent
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to multiple coalitional members. 1 The next to nearest packet forwarding approach was
already discussed by Tadić and Rodgers (2002), however not in a cooperative context.
If the destination is not found among the direct neighbors or among the neighbors of
the coalitional partners of a node, the packet p is forwarded from node i to its neighbor j
according to the preferential probability
Πj =
kαj∑
m k
α
m
(2)
where kp denotes the degree of node p, the sum runs over the neighbors, and α is a
parameter describing the preference of high degree neighbours over low degree ones. As
shown in (Wang, Wang, Yin, Xie, and Zhou, 2006), α = −1 is optimal regarding network
congestion. Similar to (Wang, Wang, Yin, Xie, and Zhou, 2006), we assume that in a
certain network none of the tokens may take the same edge again. There is a theoretical
possibility that this assumption may lead to deadlock situations, but in practice the number
of these scenarios is so low that they do not inﬂuence the results 2.
We will monitor the overall network eﬃciency with the total energy consumption ET
(which is simply the sum of the energy consumption of individual nodes) and the average
packet arrival time T¯arr. Naturally, as the results will show as well, these two indicators
correlate, since if the packets reach their destination earlier, in general less transmission
steps are required. Before the exact deﬁnition of the game, we introduce some examples
to show how cooperation aﬀects network dynamics.
3 Results
3.1 Example I
When considering network size for the demonstration of the results, on the one hand we
have to take into account that we need a minimum level of complexity for the routing not
to be trivial, and on the other hand we have to keep computations tractable and we have
1A technical note: If we would perform the search according to the lexicographic ordering of the
neighbors, the nodes with lesser index would be more loaded in such cases. To address this issue and
equalize the load in such cases we always start the search from a random index among the coalitional
neighbors.
2E.g. in a network of 300 nodes with R=25 during a simulation of 1000 steps, from the 25000 package
only about an average of 40 become deadlocked.
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to be able to visualize the results as well. The network of 30 nodes depicted in Fig. 1 was
generated with parameters m = 3, β = −2 and a 10 node seed.
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Figure 1: Network of example 1.
Regarding traﬃc dynamics, it is important to diﬀerentiate between congested and non
congested cases. Following (Arenas, Díaz-Guilera, and Guimera, 2001) we deﬁne the con-
gestion measure η as
η(R) = lim
t→∞
C
R
〈∆Np〉
∆t
where ∆Np = N(t+∆t)−N(t) with 〈...〉 indicates average over time windows of length ∆t
and Np(t) represents the number of data packets present in the network at time t. If η(R)
is signiﬁcantly grater than zero (we can say that approximately η(R) > 0.25), it indicates
a congested state of the network (since the number of packets present in the network is
steadily increasing). Although our aim in this article is not to determine the Rc values in
various cases, we will use this indicator to describe non congested (R < Rc, η ≃ 0) and
congested cases (R > Rc, η > 0).
If we simulate the traﬃc dynamics in a non-congested case with parameters α = −1,
R = 5 C = 3 Figure 2 depicts the energy usage results of nodes in 10 simulation.
On the one hand, it can bee seen in Fig. 2 that the energy usage values are quite
stable, the variance of the values is relatively low. This means that the average of several
simulations can be regarded as a representative result. Furthermore it can be easily seen
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Figure 2: Energy usage of the nodes in all-singleton conﬁguration. Simulation length: 1000
steps. Results of 10 simulations.
that, as expected, the energy consumption of the high degree nodes is high. The total
energy used by the network is ET = 7491.5 in this case, while T¯arr = 4.54.
Next we analyze how coalition formation aﬀects energy consumption values and network
eﬃciency. Let us pick one coalition, e.g. {5, 6, 18}. First, it can be checked that it is a
valid coalition, since nodes 5,6 and 18 form a G3 complete graph in the network. If we run
the simulations according to the routing protocol deﬁned in 2, we get the results depicted
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 (see the averaged values in Table 1) shows that the energy consumption of
the coalitional member nodes increased, while the energy consumption of all other nodes
decreased. As we will see, this is not surprising. Let us consider an i member of the
coalition C, who is forwarding a package with destination d. Let us furthermore suppose
that d is in the neighborhood of j, which is an element of C as well. If no cooperation is
present, i will forward this package randomly (taking into account only node degrees) to
one of its neighbors (k). This way the package will spend at least two more time steps in
the network (if k is adjacent to d it may arrive in 2 steps), and in the future probably reach
d via an undeﬁned path, not necessary including j. In contrast, when the coalition C forms,
the package will be forwarded to j. This means that coalitional members increase each
others traﬃc load via applying the second order topological information. However as the
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Figure 3: Energy usage of the nodes in the case when coalition {5, 6, 18} forms (all other).
Simulation length: 1000 steps. Results of 10 simulations.
values ET = 6651 and T¯arr = 3.76 show in this case, network eﬃciency is greatly increased
even by the formation of this single coalition. In other words, the coalition formation
resulted in a signiﬁcant positive externality regarding all the remaining nodes.
Table 1 shows the energy consumption of individual nodes, the total energy usage of
the system and average packet arrival time, in the case when various coalitions form.
We can see that, the dominant trend is validating our intuition - the energy consumption
of the nodes which take part in coalitions signiﬁcantly increases. In some exceptional cases
(see e.g. the coalition {2, 11, 23}), the the beneﬁts implied by more eﬃcient routing may
overcome the handicap of increased coalitional load. In other words, this means that if
we deﬁne the payoﬀ of players and coalitions purely as the energy saving compared to the
all singleton case, coalitions will not be stable in most of the cases. On the other hand,
considering the ET and T¯arr values, it can be clearly seen that coalition formation always
enhances network performance, so from the point of view of network operation, it should
be promoted.
According to these results we will introduce two modelling assumptions, and deﬁne the
payoﬀs of nodes.
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∅ {2, 3, 12} {2, 6, 15} {2, 11, 23} {3, 5, 7} {4, 8, 17} {5, 6, 18}
1 195 179 169 174 176 189 160
2 341 364 404 333 285 328 269
3 260 236 235 243 258 260 207
4 188 174 171 178 168 189 164
5 755 699 676 691 783 742 826
6 866 797 914 782 726 845 898
7 491 453 433 450 579 479 378
8 294 282 259 274 264 330 255
9 100 96 91 93 85 96 83
10 649 594 584 610 580 641 541
11 188 172 165 185 159 179 139
12 263 303 242 242 224 250 222
13 140 128 128 129 119 134 117
14 201 188 184 188 179 193 174
15 105 98 116 97 90 101 91
16 76 71 71 71 67 74 64
17 203 193 185 195 179 225 175
18 368 344 337 345 318 362 414
19 160 149 147 149 139 155 132
20 100 95 93 97 89 98 83
21 169 154 153 160 152 163 147
22 201 185 193 195 180 200 169
23 116 106 105 116 106 114 93
24 64 64 57 64 59 66 58
25 427 394 387 385 374 414 332
26 71 71 68 67 65 70 61
27 227 211 213 214 196 215 171
28 122 116 112 108 110 122 99
29 80 74 73 76 71 78 69
30 71 69 66 66 61 71 58
ET 7492 7060 7031 6977 6843 7382 6651
T¯arr 4.54 4.22 4.14 4.23 3.98 4.42 3.76
Table 1: Energy consumption of individual nodes, total energy usage of the system, and
average packet arrival time in the case of various coalition formations. ∅ means the all
singleton coalition, in other cases only non-singleton coalitions are enumerated. Every
result is an averaged value of 10 simulations.
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3.2 Key assumptions and definition of the game
• First, we modify the routing protocol as follows. We introduce coalitional load bal-
ancing (CLB), which means that a parameter σ1 is deﬁned to account for load relief
of the coalitions. CLB works in the following way. If a member of a coalition is
forwarding a packet, the destination of which can not be found neither among his
own neighbors, nor the neighbors of among coalitional members, he will take into
account the parameter sigma during the routing procedure. Namely the probability
describing he will forward the package to his neighbor j will be
Πj =
kαj∑
m k
α
m
σ (3)
where σ = σ1 if j is in the coalition of i and σ = 1 − σ1 otherwise. This, in the
case of σ1 < 0.5 will ensure that packets, who do not have their destination in the
neighborhood of the coalition, will be probably turned away from it (in exchange
for packets who have, will be drawn into it). We have to note that the inequality
0 < σ1 shall be strict, because σ = 0 may lead to deadlock and blocking situations
as depicted in Fig. 4.
C1
s
i
d
Figure 4: Coincidence of deadlock and blocking in the case of σ = 0 and a packet with
destination d arriving from s to i.
Consider a packet with destination d arriving from s to i. As i can not ﬁnd d
neither among his neighbors, nor among the neighbors of his coalition partners, he
is theoretically forbidden to route it towards any coalitional partner. This leads to
a deadlock situation. On the other hand, in the case of the given topology it can
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be seen that node d is reachable from s only via coalition C1, which means that the
actual packet will never reach its destination, even if we suppose some more edges
from i outward C1 and thus disregard the problem of deadlock.
• Second, we will assume an independent network operator, who is interested in eﬃcient
operation of the system. Furthermore we will assume that this network operator is
able to reward, or in other words somehow compensate cooperating players for their
increased traﬃc. If we suppose that nodes represent commercial mobile devices the
most straightforward interpretation of this compensation is if we assume that this
compensation can be included in the service fee. However, other means of compen-
sation interpretation are also imaginable (e.g. the packets of cooperating nodes get
priority in the routing process etc.). Formally we will assume that a good equivalent
to the 0 < pre < 1 part of the total energy saving of the system, compared to the all-
singleton reference case (or its equivalent in some form), will be redistributed among
the nodes, proportional to their actual traﬃc. This way the nodes who choose to
cooperate and thus increase their traﬃc and enhance network performance, will gain
more reward from the network operator. We will call this compensation net reward.
According to these considerations, during the routing protocol we apply CLB, and the
payoﬀ of single node i (v(i)) is determined as his energy saving compared to the all singleton
case plus the net reward. If according to these assumptions we repeat the simulations with
σ1 = 0.05 for coalitions detailed in Table 1, and calculate nodal payoﬀs with pre = 0.7, we
get the results summarized in Table 2.
The ﬁrst thing we can see in Table 2 is that all payoﬀs in the case of coalition formations
are positive. This means that now (at least dominantly) superadditivity holds, which points
toward the direction of coalitional stability. Second, the signiﬁcant positive externalities
still hold in all cases. Third, the application of CLB does not decrease network eﬃciency,
in contrast the ET and T¯arr values are slightly enhanced.
3.2.1 Coalitional stability
To get an impression about the stability of coalitions and about scenarios where multiple
coalitions coexist let us analyze the stability of coalitions {2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7} and {4, 8, 17}.
To keep computations feasible, we restrict our calculations, and assume that potential
deviators may not form coalitions with external nodes. Furthermore, for the same reason,
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∅ {2, 3, 12} {2, 6, 15} {2, 11, 23} {3, 5, 7} {4, 8, 17} {5, 6, 18}
1 0 30 45 33 43 8 59
2 0 46 30 56 93 13 101
3 0 66 57 40 62 7 83
4 0 23 32 28 40 59 51
5 0 117 143 123 112 38 101
6 0 138 112 146 225 31 145
7 0 73 97 77 37 27 160
8 0 36 52 44 63 63 73
9 0 13 17 15 26 6 28
10 0 103 127 98 149 35 186
11 0 29 44 28 50 13 66
12 0 21 48 34 69 18 67
13 0 21 22 16 33 13 37
14 0 24 33 27 49 12 51
15 0 15 22 15 22 5 30
16 0 9 11 9 17 4 21
17 0 25 38 29 41 97 51
18 0 45 70 50 82 12 42
19 0 17 26 23 38 11 43
20 0 12 15 11 19 5 25
21 0 19 31 24 32 7 43
22 0 27 32 28 37 8 53
23 0 15 23 31 23 3 33
24 0 7 10 8 12 2 14
25 0 67 91 73 102 24 141
26 0 10 11 10 17 2 20
27 0 29 40 29 47 7 66
28 0 15 24 15 24 9 35
29 0 10 17 11 18 3 21
30 0 9 15 9 17 3 22
30 71 69 66 66 61 71 58
ET 7492 6957 6823 6921 6692 7219 6556
T¯arr 4.54 4.14 4 4.14 3.87 4.38 3.73
Table 2: Nodal payoﬀs, total energy usage of the system, and average packet arrival time
in the case of various coalition formations. ∅ means the all singleton coalition, in other
cases only non-singleton coalitions are enumerated. Every result is an averaged value of 10
simulations.
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Coalitions v(2) v(3) v(4) v(5) v(6) v(7) v(8) v(15) v(17) ET T¯arr
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 105 104 97 231 291 101 143 39 129 5931 3.32
{2, 6}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 109 104 100 234 307 108 140 39 131 5883 3.29
{2, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 112 71 86 141 255 61 119 26 120 6278 3.63
{6, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 116 81 89 165 252 79 125 24 125 6202 3.54
{3, 5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 98 64 87 131 231 39 105 26 113 6401 3.71
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5},{4, 8, 17} 53 80 83 184 181 130 118 30 124 6335 3.68
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 7},{4, 8, 17} 72 58 92 244 217 113 125 31 124 6186 3.56
{2, 6, 15}, {5, 7},{4, 8, 17} 75 95 92 171 237 85 131 36 126 6129 3.45
{2, 6, 15},{4, 8, 17} 32 60 80 166 124 104 111 25 119 6524 3.82
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 8} 105 106 78 214 288 97 120 37 70 6040 3.37
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{4, 17} 100 103 82 203 281 94 106 36 85 6059 3.38
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7},{8, 17} 108 99 71 218 296 99 125 39 100 5985 6.03
{2, 6, 15}, {3, 5, 7} 97 101 66 212 275 94 123 39 100 6033 3.38
Table 3: Nodal payoﬀs in various coalitional structures. The values are averaged results of
10 simulations.
Partition Coalitional values
{2,6,15} 435
{2,6}, {15} 416 , 39
{2,15}, {6} 138 , 255
{2},{6,15} 116 , 276
{2},{6},{15} 98,231,26
Table 4: Partition function of coalition {2, 6, 15}
we assume that only one coalition may break up in the same time. According to this, the
node relevant payoﬀs, from which the the values of the partition functions can be calculated
by summing over the coalitions, are summarized in Table 3.
Let us consider coalition {2, 6, 15} ﬁrst. In this case, if we restrict ourselves to this
residual game, the partition function will be as summarized in Table 4
If we assume transferable utility (which may be realistic assumption e.g. in the case
of mobile commercial devices where the players may be compensated for higher energy
consumption via lower service fees), and calculate the (pessimistic) recursive core (Kóczy,
2007) for the partition function presented in Table 4, we ﬁnd that the partition {2, 6}, {15}
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is stable, with the payoﬀ conﬁguration
x(2) + x(6) = 416 x(15) = 39 116 < x(2) < 161 (4)
If we take a closer look on the ET and T¯arr values in Table 3, we can see that (assuming
that the members of the other coalitions do not deviate) this partition of {2, 6, 15} results
in the most eﬃcient operation of the network.
Regarding {3, 5, 7} and {4, 8, 17} we ﬁnd that in both cases the grand coalitions are
stable as depicted in Fig. 5. Again we can see in Table 3 that the partitions in which
{3, 5, 7} and {4, 8, 17} form the grand coalition are the most eﬃcient.
x(3)
x(5
)
x(4)
x(8
)
Figure 5: Recursive cores of coalitions {3, 5, 7} and {4, 8, 17} in the payoﬀ space. In the ﬁrst
case the equality x(3)+x(5)+x(7) = 436, in the second the equality x(4)+x(8)+x(17) =
369 holds
Appendix A holds further data underlining the trend that stable coalitional conﬁgura-
tions correspond to the most eﬃcient operation modes of the network.
3.3 Example II
In this example we use a network with 300 nodes to analyze how the eﬃciency enhancing
eﬀect of coalition formation scales up. Due to the limitations of computing capacity in
this case we do not analyze coalitional stability, only how the various coalitional conﬁgu-
rations aﬀect the performance indicators. Based on the previous results, we assume that
coalition structures which imply the most high performance network operational modes
are dominantly stable, if the net reward is high enough.
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The network used in this example was generated with a seed of 10 nodes, m = 4 and
β = −2.
3.3.1 Non-congested case
First we analyze the network performance without congestion. We use the parameters
C = 7 and α = −1, R = 10. Results are summarized in Table 5.
Coalition structure ET T¯arr η
∅ 51126 34.81 0.07
5x2 48579 33.28 -0.01
10x2 45307 30.90 -0.03
20x2 41078 28.05 -0.04
50x2 35078 23.88 0.03
100x2 31564 21.57 -0.02
1x5 2x4 7x3 38963 26.38 0.05
1x5 2x4 17x3 34705 23.07 0.01
1x5 2x4 27x3 33445 22.37 -0.08
1x5 2x4 31x3 16x2 31492 20.85 0
1x5 2x4 31x3 66x2 29209 19.13 0.02
Table 5: Network performance at various levels of cooperation and various coalitional struc-
tures. The column ’Coalition structures’ indicates the number of diﬀerent size coalitions
(e.g. ’1x5 2x4 31x3 66x2’ indicates 1 coalition of size 5, 2 of size 4 etc.).
Table 5 shows that (as expected) as the level of cooperation increases, the network
performance is enhanced. Simulation results show that this performance increase can be
very signiﬁcant. The presence of larger size coalitions implies further growth in network
eﬃciency. The η values which are practically equal to 0 show that no congestion appears.
3.3.2 Congested case
Since the measure of congestion η is also a function of coalitional structure
Regarding the performance indicators, the results are similar to the non-congested case,
except that the beneﬁts of cooperation in the congested case are even more prominent. On
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Coalition structure ET T¯arr η
∅ 90421 103.29 1.86
5x2 89214 98.79 1.83
10x2 88279 91.79 1.54
20x2 84368 74.85 1.12
50x2 77642 45.26 0.5
100x2 73470 35.37 0.19
1x5 2x4 7x3 79237 71.52 1.07
1x5 2x4 17x3 75886 55.61 0.74
1x5 2x4 27x3 73792 47.62 0.52
1x5 2x4 31x3 16x2 71771 35.1 0.35
1x5 2x4 31x3 66x2 67934 29.65 0.27
Table 6: Network performance at various levels of cooperation and various coalitional struc-
tures. The column ’Coalition structures’ indicates the number of diﬀerent size coalitions
(e.g. ’1x5 2x4 31x3 66x2’ indicates 1 coalition of size 5, 2 of size 4 etc.).
the other hand, if we analyze the η values in Table 6 we can see that increasing level of
nodal cooperation alleviates network congestion as well. Very high levels of cooperation
almost eliminate network congestion.
4 Conclusions and future work
We introduced a game theoretic model to describe coalitional formation in wireless net-
works with ﬁxed communication structure and analyzed the implied phenomena on scale-
free topology. Cooperation was interpreted as exchange of local topological information.
We have shown that if we deﬁne the payoﬀs of the nodes exclusively by the energy sav-
ing compared to the non-cooperative case, players are not motivated to form coalitions,
since the traﬃc of such cooperating agents increase. To enhance coalitional stability and
retain positive externalities we introduced coalitional load balancing and net reward, and
calculated the payoﬀ of nodes according to these assumptions. This means that these
modiﬁcations allow us to motivate the players for cooperation and to enhance network
performance in the same time. Furthermore we have shown that increasing levels of coop-
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eration ease network congestion.
There are several directions in which the current concept may be extended. First, as we
consider a wireless environment, it is straightforward to assume that the nodes (or at least
some of the nodes) are moving. In this case the stability of coalitions may be subject to
change due to change in the transmission costs. Second, in the current model we assumed
that the exchange of local topological information is free, or it can be neglected compared
to the energy cost of packet forwarding. To make the model more realistic one may assume
that the exchange of local topological information itself takes place via packet forwarding,
thus its energy cost may be incorporated in the model. Third, the concept of net reward
may be reﬁned as well. E.g. it can be assumed that the network operator holds a few high
degree nodes (e.g. with ﬁxed position - base stations), and is able to redistribute only the
energy savings corresponding to this nodes among the players.
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Appendix A
To give some further impression into coalitional stability of the model we analyze some
more cases. Let us consider the coalitions {5, 7, 9}, {10, 13, 14} and {11, 18, 23} and the
values summarized in Table 7.
Considering {5, 7, 9}, the stability analysis shows that {5, 7}, {9} is the stable partition
with x(5) + x(7) = 373, x(9) = 38 and 233 < x(5) < 235. Considering {10, 13, 14} and
{11, 18, 23} the grand coalitions are stable, with payoﬀs depicted in Fig. 6. Again, it can
be seen that stable partitions correspond to the most eﬃcient network operation modes.
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